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Bartles, C. K. (2019). Russian Force Structure for the Conduct of Large-Scale Combat Operations. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 45(1), 52-61.
Since the General Staff decides matters of military doctrine and procurement, it is considered essential that officers break their fixation with their branch of service (Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, etc.) and branch of arms (infantry, armor, artillery, etc.) to avoid the "trade union mentality" that hinders military doctrine and procurement matters in Western armies.
Bradbeer, T. G., PhD. (2018). Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Historical Case Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires in Large-Scale Combat Operations. Military Review, 98(5), 26-32.
The Russian rocket attack on Ukrainian forces at Zelenopillya on 11 July 2014 was the first example of Russia's contemporary reconnaissance-strike model on display. The strike targeted a large Ukrainian assembly area where Ukrainian forces were preparing to uncoil and conduct an offensive. At approximately 0400 on 11 July, drones were heard overhead; at around the same time, Ukrainian forces lost the ability to communicate over their tactical radio network. A few minutes later a bevy of rockets and artillery fell on the assembly area. The result was carnage-upwards of thirty Ukrainian soldiers were killed and dozens were severely wounded, while more than two battalions' worth of combat power was destroyed.
Brubaker, A. (2019). From Structure in Peace to Ready for War: A Vision for Movement Control: Army Sustainment, 51(1), 50–53.
The article discusses the Vision for Movement Control: Movement control will be the key to supporting large-scale combat operations, and the Army must optimize its organizational structure to better execute it. The e Army is manned, trained, and equipped to fight and win our nation's wars. It creates its units with that mentality and designs movement control to support the fight during major combat operations.
Compton, C., & Boothe, L. L. (2018). The Fires complex: Organizing to win in large-scale combat operations. Fires, , 3-7.
While the newly formed Cross-Functional Teams for long-range precision Fires and air missile defense are addressing certain capability gaps to increase range and lethality in Fires platforms and munitions, the Concepts Development Division at Fort Sill is proposing force structure concepts that merge future material solutions with robust mission command for employing cross-domain Fires at echelon.
Coward, C.,Jr. (2019). Supporting global force integration while training for large-scale combat operations. Fires, , 7-10.
The second iteration of Roving Sands was conducted in March 2019 at Fort Bliss, Texas, and White Sands Missile Range, N.M. The 32nd AAMDC exercised and evaluated one ADA brigade headquarters, four Patriot battalions in mixed software configurations, one Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery, and several external enablers in support of a notional corps commander engaged in LSCO.
Denn, W., Turner, J., & Wojciechowski, A. (2020). Improving-brigade combat team intelligence collection operations for large-scale ground combat. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 46(3), 37-41.
Brigades are learning that large-scale ground combat operations require fundamentally different skillsets and competencies than the counterinsurgency fight of the past. Because of how quickly the battlefield moves-at the speed of mechanized forces attacking over large distances-the above vignette is an illustration of how brigades fail to layer their intelligence collection over large areas to give friendly forces enough warning and certainty of enemy intentions to adequately prepare for combat. There is little expectation that a junior captain can be a subject matter expert in what these ISR assets can or cannot collect.
Fandre, M. (2020). Medical Changes Needed for Large-Scale Combat Operations: Observations from Mission Command Training Program Warfighter Exercises. Military Review, 100(3), 36–45.
The article focuses on analysis and observations gained during Warfighter exercises (WFXs) identify areas in which the U.S. Army is not prepared for the medical realities of large-scale combat operations (LSCO). It mentions functions including sustainment, protection, and intelligence and contrast to counterinsurgency paradigm. It also mentions U.S. military must invest in the necessary medical infrastructure and utilizing adjunct systems such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
Fiore, N. (2020). The 2003 Battle of Baghdad: A Case Study of Urban Battle during Large-Scale Combat Operations. Military Review, 100(5), 127-139.
The major battles of the Syrian Civil War and the war against the Islamic State clearly demonstrate that neither the Russian nor American armies can avoid urban battle. Although both forces achieved their strategic objectives, visual media from Aleppo and the liberation of Mosul reminded the world how destructive urban battles can still be. American military strategists questioned whether American voters, policy makers, and military leaders would continue to accept such high levels of casualties, collateral damage to infrastructure and the environment, and the concomitant reconstruction expense to US taxpayers. From a historical perspective, the devastation of Mosul's urban center was quite normal, but large-scale combat operations doctrine expects US Army and allied land forces to replicate the exceptionally low destruction of the 2003 Battle of Baghdad, even when fighting peer adversaries.
Gingrich, D. M. (2019). Do large-scale combat operations require a new type of leader? Military Review, 99(5), 134-140.
In Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, large-scale combat operations are described as "intense, lethal, and brutal" and require agile and adaptive leaders to overcome the complexity and chaos of tomorrow's battlefield. Today's leaders do not need prior experience in these conditions to be successful because the Army Leader Development strategy transcends the range of military operations. In fact, the large-scale combat environment requires leaders to demonstrate competencies outlined in FM 6-22, Leader Development, now more than ever.
Correction to “Do Large-Scale Combat Operations Require a New Type of Leader?” (2019). Military Review, 99(6), 140.
A correction is presented to an article "Do Large-Scale Combat Operations Require a New Type of Leader" which was published in September-October 2019 issue of the perodical.
Griggs, R. S., Haider, J., & Flatebo, L. (2020). The Small-Team Replacement System: Wartime Replacement Systems in Large-Scale Combat Operations. Military Review, 100(1), 22-28.
The 2017 revision of Field Manual 3-0, Operations, and the 2018 National Defense Strategy direct the Army and joint forces to prepare for large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against major regional powers. To prevail in these conflicts, the Army must be able to build and maintain the combat power required to enable operational reach, freedom of action, and prolonged endurance for the joint force. Building and maintaining combat power in the face of high-intensity combat casualty rates requires an effective personnel replacement system.
HOFSTETTER, J., & WOJCIECHOWSKI, A. (2020). Electromagnetic Spectrum Survivability in Large-Scale Combat Operations. Infantry, 109(4), 21–24.
The article examines that the U.S. Army has a wealth of experience operating in an environment where it possesses overwhelming electronic warfare (EW) dominance. Topics include reports that Russia was able to effectively detect, jam, and destroy Ukraine command posts using their EW platforms and during years of counter insurgency warfare, the U.S. Army's focus on its EW practices and procedures waned.
Johnson, M. (2020). TIPS FOR SUCCESS: Seven Questions Essential to Preparing FSCs for Large-Scale Combat Operations. Army Sustainment, 70–73.
The article focuses on several factors essential to preparing Forward Support Company (FSC) leaders for large-scale combat operations and National Training Center (NTC). Topics discussed include FSC needs to reference Army Techniques Publication (ATP); combining the Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) with the Unit Maintenance Collection Point (UMCP); and FSC needs to conduct deliberate rehearsals.
Lundy, M., Creed, R., & Pence, S. (2019). Feeding the Forge: Sustaining Large-Scale Combat Operations: Army Logistician. Army Sustainment, 51(3), 30-33.
According to a July 2017 Popular Mechanics article by Kyle Mikokami, in 2015, a Russian-made unmanned aerial vehicle dropped a single thermite grenade on a Ukrainian ammunition supply point. In retired Col. Gregory Fontenot's book, The First Infantry Division and the U.S. Army Transformed: Road to Victory in Desert Storm, 1970-1991, he notes that in the Persian Gulf War "persistence and determination could do nothing to solve the problem of scarce and hard-to-deliver repair parts " The problem reflected a systemic problem in Army logistics: parts arrived in Saudi Arabia and disappeared into a morass of storage sites
Lundy, M. D. (2018). Meeting the Challenge of Large-Scale Combat Operations Today and Tomorrow. Military Review, 98(5), 111-118.
While our Army learned invaluable lessons over the last seventeen years of limited contingency operations, the experience culturally imprinted a generation of Army leaders for one type of warfare. An increasingly volatile operational environment (OE) characterized by great power competition demands that our Army adapt to the realities of a world where large-scale ground combat against a peer threat is more likely than at any time in recent history. Preparing for the most lethal and challenging threats to our nation warrants continued bold changes in how we man, equip, train, and employ Army forces, especially at echelons above brigade.
Noble, T. M., Griesinger, S. K., & Moriarity, J. M. (2019). Patriot Training For Large-Scale Combat Operations. Fires, , 42-44.
The 4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Regiment persistently works to sharpen both its tactical and technical proficiency as it prepares for Force Readiness Unit (FRU) assumption. Since 4-5th ADA's return from U.S. Central Command area of responsibility in 2017, the unit executed a full Patriot System reset and upgrade to Combined Cryptographic Modernization Phase 1 and Post Deployment Build 8, a complete change in leadership at both the battalion and battery levels, and the completion of Table VIII certifications on October 2018.
Owens, R. (2019). Tactical Information Collection: How Intelligence Sustains the Faster Pace of Large-Scale Combat Operations. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 45(1), 67-69.
Returning to the basics of intelligence production and applying doctrinal collection management tools, techniques, and procedures will help ensure synchronization and success on the battlefield. Currently, because of organic asset vulnerabilities against peer threat capabilities, the collection assets of a brigade combat team will rarely ever be able to collect the entire area of its longest ranging weapon systems. [...]the information collection plan will also allow assets to report relevant information to those units accurately and rapidly. Mr. Ryan Owens was a U.S. Army all-source intelligence technician and currently works as an Information Collection Planner Course contractor instructor at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence.
Pena, N. G. (2019). Analyzing an underground facility for large-scale combat operations. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 45(1), 62-66.
When learning about underground facilities, the intelligence professional might ask, "How are we supposed to provide a maneuver commander with accurate and timely threat assessments of an underground facility during largescale combat operations?" Then there is the logical followon question: "And how is that intelligence professional expected to provide the same information about any one of an estimated 4,800 underground facilities with little or no intelligence?" This article shares the lessons learned from my intelligence section during a deployment to the Republic of Korea on a regionally aligned forces mission.
Porritt, T. J., & Roe,Calvin P.,,II. (2019). Aggressive counterfire with ground moving target indicator in large-scale combat operations. Fires, , 26-27.
The analyst was already determining the number of vehicles for the strength input on the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System. Measuring the formation area enabled a more precise target engagement and weaponeering solution for the fire control element. [...]providing better ammunition management throughout the DIVARTY firing units.
Rein, C. M., PhD. (2018). Weaving the tangled web: Military deception in large-scale combat operations. Military Review, 98(5), 10-17.
Throughout the recorded history of warfare, military planners and commanders have sought to deceive their adversary as to the size, timing, or location of an attack in order to gain a decisive advantage. From the famous Trojan Horse to modern efforts to use the electromagnetic spectrum to "spoof" or jam sensors, deception in some form remains an essential component of military operations. Whether attacking an unsuspecting enemy on Christmas morning, as Washington did at Trenton, or emplacing "Quaker guns" (logs painted black to resemble cannons) to provide the impression of strength, U.S. forces have successfully built on a long legacy of military deception (MILDEC) in order to prevail in the Nation's wars.
Schifferle, P. J., PhD. (2018). Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations. Military Review, 98(5), 18-25.
Large-scale combat operations are at the far right of the conflict continuum and associated with war. Historically, battlefields in large-scale combat operations have been more chaotic, intense, and highly destructive than those the Army has experienced in the past decades. During the 1943 battles of Sidi Bou Zid and Kasserine Pass in World War II, 5,000 American Soldiers were killed over the course of just 10 days; during the first three days of fighting the Army lost Soldiers at a rate of 1,333 per day.
Simmering, M. J. (2020). Working to Master Large-Scale Combat Operations: Recommendations for Commanders to Consider during Home-Station Training. Military Review, 100(3), 19–26.
The article discusses the Vision for Movement Control: Movement control will be the key to supporting large-scale combat operations, and the Army must optimize its organizational structure to better execute it. The e Army is manned, trained, and equipped to fight and win our nation's wars. It creates its units with that mentality and designs movement control to support the fight during major combat operations.
Smith, J. (2020). Leadership during Large-Scale Combat Operations. Military Review, 100(1), 29-35.
For the past twenty-five years, the US had invested all of its defense spending into counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations all over the world, with a focus on US Central Command, US Africa Command, and US Pacific Command. While this deployment to Eastern Europe came as a surprise, vast communication and logistical resources allowed the US to send troops overseas quickly, with no outside interference. Once the combined joint task force entered the "dominate phase" of operations, division and brigade commanders started relying heavily on the only combat experience they had: limited contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here, Smith discusses how military officers could lead large-scale combat operations in 2025.
Thornton, C. D. (2020). The New Normal: Information Collection Planning in Large-Scale Combat Operations. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 46(3), 46-49.
While it won't help your warfighter exercise, it is invaluable to be able to cover two named areas of interest (one with a ground moving target indicator radar and one with the full-motion video common sensor payload) when you do not have a large number of combined force air component commander assets in support. [...]security of key links in the system chain, such as Gray Eagle data terminals and Ground Control Stations, is a must. The key limitation to this modularity in division and higher operations is that a maneuver commander must commit a maneuver formation to conduct reconnaissance and security tasks.
VanDeusen, R. W., & Knight, W. N. (2019). Targeting in Large-Scale Combat Operations. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 45(1), 18-22.
With this understanding, they confirm that templated NAIs and target areas of interest (TAIs) make sense according to likely friendly and enemy actions. [...]they also confirm that lethal and nonlethal delivery assets planned during COA development remain properly aligned in time and space to achieve the commander's desired effects. [...]doctrine does not clearly delineate the relationship between decision points and high-payoff targets.
Waitl, F. L. (2019). Large-scale combat operations of the past and implications for the future. Engineer, 49(3), 26-27.
Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, provides a doctrinal approach for U.S. Army theater armies, corps, divisions, and brigades to address the challenges associated with large-scale ground combat; FM 3-0 states, "Historically, battlefields in [LSCO] have been more chaotic, intense, and highly destructive than those the Army has experienced in the past several decades.
Fogg, R. D., & Latham Jr., W. C. (2019). Risky Business: Commercial Support for Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations. Military Review, 99(4), 14–21.
The article focuses on U.S. Army's continuing reliance on commercial support which reflects geopolitical considerations such as legislative force caps and host-nation limitations on American military personnel. It mentions large-scale ground combat operations (LSGCO) will feature more casualties, a higher operational tempo, and greater demand for supplies and equipment. It also mentions contractors will face threats from enemy long-range fires, weapons of mass destruction and sabotage.
Doyle, D., & Coombs, A. (2018). How Has the Joint Readiness Training Center Changed to Adapt to Large-Scale Combat Operations? Military Review, 98(5), 70–79.
The article discusses how the combat training center prepares units and leaders for large-scale combat operations by creating a decisive-action training environment. It mentions scalable, flexible scenarios that challenge and stress leaders and force them to consider operations other than counterinsurgencies and events of its wars from the America Revolution to the Vietnam War. It also mentions hybrid threat including motorized and armored forces.
Murray, D. S. (2019). The CDTF Training Enhancement Initiative: A New Era of Live, Toxic Training in Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations. CML Army Chemical Review, 1–5.
In 1980, U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, along with Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer, supported the 1980 Chemical Systems Program Review, which documented the need for the U.S. Army Chemical Corps to embark upon a new training paradigm to prepare our Soldiers and joint force partners to fight, survive, and win in a chemical environment.
Hatter, G., Schultz, S., Bell, C., Walker, L., & Mangan, B. (2019). Intelligence policy considerations in large-scale combat operations. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 45(3), 21-25.
We often hear, "We need to change our policy," but is this always a valid statement? Probably not, particularly if one considers the times we use it interchangeably with rules of engagement, authorities, roles and functions, or even doctrine. However, when considering multi-domain operations and large-scale combat operations, this statement is invaluable. It should trigger the critical thought necessary to apply "prudence of wisdom" to our intelligence policies now, so that we will be able to fight and win in the future and not be frustrated with "policies" that are not fit for purpose and are late to need.
Mesa, B. R. (2019). Addressing army aviation intelligence training. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, 45(2), 58-60.
In recent years, the U.S. Army's military intelligence branch has been going through a transformation to prepare the next generation of intelligence professionals for largescale combat operations in a complex operational environment. The 2018 National Defense Strategy underscores our emergence from a period of strategic atrophy, declaring, "inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security."
Grau, L., & Bartles, C. (2019). Russian artillery fire control for large-scale combat operations. Fires, , 7-14.
Armed conflict begins with reconnaissance. Experience shows that without reconnaissance-there is no information, without information- command and control is impossible, and without command and control- victory is impossible.
Jennings, N. A. (2017). Expeditionary Land Power. Military Review, 97(1), 42–48.
The article examines the Mexican-American War with regard to expeditionary land power. The Mexican-American War was reportedly an armed conflict between the U.S. and Mexico after Texas gained independence from Mexico. Also discussed are the U.S. Army's role in the war, how the Army influenced North American security environments, and the victory of the U.S.
Arndt, J. S. (2012). The True Napoleon of the West: General Winfield Scott’s Mexico City Campaign and the Origins of the U.S. Army’s Combined-Arms Combat Division. Journal of Military History, 76(3), 649–671.
Combined-arms combat divisions emerged fully during the French Revolutionary Wars in the late 1700s. This paper explores how U.S. General Winfeld Scott's Mexico City campaign (9 March-14 September 1847) contributed to this military innovation's transatlantic diffusion.
