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Articles
Cowie II, L. K. (2019). The Ghosts of Kasserine Pass: Maximizing the Effectiveness of Airpower. JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, 92, 74–81.
The article presents insights on the maximization of air power by the U.S. Air Force and highlights the operations conducted by it during the battle of Kasserine Pass in Tunisia during the Second World War. Topics discussed include the flexibility of air power, characteristics and advantages of remotely piloted aircraft and implementation of required changes with regard to the matter.
Budiansky, S. (2011). Triumph at Kasserine Pass. World War II, 26(1), 30–37.
The article discusses the Battle of Kasserine Pass, a series of battles in February 1943 when the U.S. troops had their first major battlefield encounters with the Germany army. It states that the American forces were hurled back 50 miles, losing 183 tanks and almost 7,000 men. According to General Omar Bradley, the battle was probably the worst performance of U.S. Army troops in their history. Historian Martin Blumenson described the event as incredible.
Wilkinson, S. (2012). What We Learned . . . from the Kasserine Pass. Military History, 29(2), 18.
The article presents a discussion of the 1943 Battle of the Kasserine Pass. It details the battle scenario at the time of war including the so called Operation Satin that was planned by the Allies to destabilize the Afrika Korps in Tunisia. The article also provides a list of the lessons from the Kasserine Pass battle including the mistake committed by then Major General Lloyd Fredendall of allowing his men to fight from a distance.
HOWE, G. F. (1949). Faid - Kasserine: The German View. Military Affairs, 13(4), 216–222.
The article discusses the 1943 Battle for Kasserine Pass, Tunisia, part of the North Africa campaign of World War II between German armed forces and the allied British and American armed forces. The author considers the German perspective of the engagement and some of the subjects include German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, the comparative strategic importance of the Faid and Kasserine Passes, and German Field Marshal Albert Kesselring.
Urness, J., & Carter, A. (2019). Kasserine pass lessons for the reemergence of SHORAD. Fires, , 28-31.
"15 Mechanical directors were the only means of efficiently and accurately targeting an aerial threat because their AAA weapons did not have fixed-to-the-barrel sights. [...]loss of mechanical directors dramatically diminished AAA system effectiveness. [...]if we consider that the desperation leading to discarding critical equipment was a symptom of constantly chasing the momentum of the battle without direction or guidance, the root cause of the "mobility problem" is integration.
Rife, S. P. (1999). Kasserine pass and the proper application of airpower. JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, 20, 71.
Discusses the Kasserine Pass battle during World War II and the lessons learned by the United States Army on the appropriate relationship between air and ground forces. The only important battle by the US Armed Forces without air superiority; Crippling obstacles of the US Air Force XII Air Support Command; Field Marshall Erwin Rommel's offensive in Tunisia; The Palm Sunday Massacre.
Philipsborn Jr., M., & Lehman, M. (1948). The Untold Story of Kasserine Pass. Saturday Evening Post, 220(33), 23–106.
The article relates the untold story behind the 1943 battle of Kasserine Pass, in Tunisia, North Africa. General Paul McDonald Robinett, referred to as "The Little Man," led the defense of Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division to its victory. Although Robinett was not heralded for winning the battle, but he proved himself to his troops.
Painton, F. C. (1943). Comeback at Kasserine Pass. Saturday Evening Post, 215(48), 20–84.
The article presents an account of the Battle of Kasserine Pass in Tunisia as of February 1943. By February fourteenth, the German Afrika Korps under General Erwin Rommel had deployed armor against two U.S. infantry battalions. The German force eventually withdrew. When asked to what he attributes the German withdrawal, a U.S. brigadier general said his soldiers fought hard.
Andrews, P. (1991). A place to be lousy in. American Heritage, 42(8), 100.
The American army that beat Hitler was thoroughly professional, but it didn't start out that way. North Africa was where it learned the hard lessons--none harder than the disaster at Kasserine. This was the campaign that taught us how to fight a war.
Dunivan, J. (2001). Kasserine pass and the necessity of training. Armor, 110(5), 14-16.
In the armor force of today, "train as you fight" and "tough, realistic training" are two of the most quoted axioms one will hear during the course of any training meeting or quarterly training brief. History is full of disasters where poorly trained soldiers were sent to an untimely death.
Hendrix, J. T. (1993). The Interwar Army and Mechanization: The American Approach. Journal of Strategic Studies, 16(1), 75–108.
Analyzes the US Army's adoption of mechanized warfare strategy during the interwar period. Leaders emphasized mobility over armor protection and firepower and later in the 1930's stressed the defense of US territory - a North American land war. The result was that America entered World War II ill-prepared to face Germany, as seen in the failure at Kasserine Pass in 1943. US doctrinal development had not kept pace with that of the Germans.
King, M. B. (1993). HINGE OF FATE. (Cover story). National Review, 45(4), 32–35.
This article discusses the World War II in the year of its 50th anniversary of the battle of Kasserine Pass in Tunisia. In this battle the U.S. forces engaged German forces directly for the first time. The attack on Pearl Harbor did not bring the U.S. into the war against the Axis, on December 8, the U.S. responded to Japan's attack by declaring war on Japan alone. Three days passed before German dictator Adolph Hitler grasped a nettle he had repeatedly refused to seize and declared war on the U.S., only then did the U.S. declare war on Nazi Germany.
Robert Dvorchak THE, A. P. (1993, Feb 08). KASSERINE PASS: ARMY'S BAPTISM OF FIRE. The Salt Lake Tribune
The Germans struck first and aimed a blow at a thin American line. On Valentine's Day, Feb. 14, 1943, scores of German panzers overran American defenders from Faid Pass in the north to Gafsa in the south. The mauled survivors of battles at places like Sidi bou Zid and Sbeitla were sent reeling 50 miles back to the Kasserine Pass.
Wallis, F. (2011, Mar 14). Gunner recalls battle of kasserine pass. Baxter Bulletin
During the two minutes of target practice on the lead tanks, Nazi tanks armed with 88-millimeter guns that shot with rifle-like accuracy, had rolled into range for firing on Battery B, an outfit of 225 infantry patrols around six 105 millimeter Howitzers, hidden away from German tank sites in a gully. In Pirnie's nomination of Cunningham for the CMO, the captain said annihilation of the 91st Battery B was certain if not for Cunningham's pattern of movement and shooting that apparently led the column commander to stop the column briefly to assess the size and location of the force firing against them.
DeGaeta, P. (1999, Feb 11). CHAOS AT THE KASSERINE PASS: [CHARLOTTE ENGLEWOOD EDITION]. Sarasota Herald Tribune
History identifies the battle by the primary strategic landmark through the Tunisian mountains known as Kasserine Pass. At 4 a.m. on February 14, 1943, the German attack began at the small village of Sidi Bou Zid. Richard J. Ertel of Port Charlotte was a corporal in F- battery, Second Battalion of the 17th Field Artillery. Ertel was in a column of prime movers and artillery pieces moving along a desert road. He recalls what happened next, "The Germans caught us on the road, and we never had a chance. The dive bombers came one right after another. We were fighting an outfit that had everything, including air superiority. We didn't have nothing but old World War I equipment." When the Stukas were finished, the Panzers came, followed by the crack Afrika Korp infantry. The German drive wasn't slowed until it reached 50 miles behind the Allied lines.
Temple, T. (2006). Erwin Rommel’s last offensive in North Africa ended with a whimper at Medenine. Military History, 23(5), 16–20.
The article focuses on the division of leadership of the Allied Forces during the battle at Tunisia in 1942. Field Marshal Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel crashed through Kasserine Pass, administering a shocking defeat to the green American troops and their ineffectual commander, Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall. The immediate situation so alarmed Allied commanders that they sent an urgent plea to Rommel's nemesis at E1 Alamein, British Eighth Army General Bernard Law Montgomery, to relieve the Americans by stepping up pressure at the Mareth Line, French-built fortifications in southern Tunisia that faced east toward the former Italian territory of Tripolitania. Long-term prospects, however, were more critical for the Axis than the Allies.
